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MODELING UNCERTAINTY IN TAX LAW 
Sarah B. Lawsky* 
Each year, the government faces a massive shortfall in tax collections: the 
annual difference between the amount taxpayers owe the government and the 
amount the government actually receives is nearly $400 billion dollars. The ques-
tions of when and why taxpayers choose to comply with the tax law are thus 
pressing ones for scholars and policymakers. Many legal scholars rely on eco-
nomic models better to understand these issues. However, none of the models that 
legal scholars use can accommodate the reality that taxpayers face unknown 
probabilities when they decide whether to comply. A taxpayer does not know, for 
example, the probability that he will be selected for audit, the probability that the 
government will identify a particular questionable position on his tax return, or 
the probability that the IRS or a court will strike the position down. 
This Article presents a formal model of tax compliance that, unlike other 
models of tax compliance used in legal scholarship, takes unknown probabilities 
into account. The model presented incorporates both the extent of a taxpayer’s 
uncertainty and the taxpayer’s attitude toward uncertainty, and thus provides 
new insights into problems as disparate as how the government should reveal in-
formation about its approach to audits, whether the government should use anti-
abuse rules to attack tax shelters, and whether tax professionals should be sub-
ject to penalties for providing certain kinds of tax advice. 
 
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 242 
I.  THREE MODELS OF TAX COMPLIANCE ............................................................. 246 
A.  Simple Costs and Benefits .......................................................................... 248 
1.  The model ............................................................................................ 248 
 
 * Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine, School of Law. Thanks to Jo-
seph Bankman, Joshua Blank, Neil Buchanan, Elizabeth Emens, Mitchell Kane, Ellen 
Lawsky, Herbert Lazerow, Leandra Lederman, Christopher Leslie, Ruth Mason, Leigh 
Osofsky, Jeff Rachlinski, Kirk Stark, Joshua Teitelbaum, Christopher Whytock, Lawrence 
Zelenak, and participants in the 2011 Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum, the 2011-2012 
Cornell Law School Faculty Workshop, the 2011 Critical Tax Conference, the 2010-2011 
U.C. Irvine School of Law Junior Colloquium, the 2011-2012 U.C. Berkeley School of Law 
Faculty Workshop, and the Spring 2011 Southern California Junior Faculty Workshop for 
helpful conversations and comments on earlier drafts. 
LAWSKY 65 STAN. L. REV. 241.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2013 3:23 PM 
242 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:241 
2.  Evaluating the model .......................................................................... 248 
B.  Expected Value ........................................................................................... 249 
1.  The model ............................................................................................ 249 
2.  Evaluating the model .......................................................................... 250 
C.  Expected Utility .......................................................................................... 254 
1.  The model ............................................................................................ 254 
2.  Evaluating the model .......................................................................... 256 
II.  THE UNCERTAINTY MODEL OF TAX COMPLIANCE ........................................... 257 
A.  Motivating the Uncertainty Model ............................................................. 258 
B.  The Uncertainty Model............................................................................... 261 
1.  The certainty component ..................................................................... 262 
2.  The uncertainty component ................................................................. 263 
3.  Combining the components ................................................................. 264 
4.  Weighing outcomes ............................................................................. 266 
5.  A tax compliance example ................................................................... 266 
III. THE UNCERTAINTY MODEL’S USEFULNESS FOR TAX LAW .............................. 268 
A.  Attitudes Toward Uncertainty .................................................................... 269 
B.  Manipulating Uncertainty .......................................................................... 270 
C.  Penalizing Tax Advisors ............................................................................. 274 
D.  Future Research: Identifying Attitudes Toward Uncertainty ..................... 275 
E.  The Simplicity Objection ............................................................................ 277 
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 278 
  
The most rational man I ever met, whom I shall call Ysidro, determined his 
own . . . preference[s] . . . . When told that he did not satisfy all of the . . . axi-
oms [of game theory], he replied that he thought it more rational to satisfy his 
preferences and let the axioms satisfy themselves. 
 —Paul Samuelson1 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are offered a choice between, on the one hand, $100, or, on 
the other hand, the opportunity to bet on a coin flip, where you will get $50 if 
the coin comes up heads and $150 if it comes up tails. If you are like most peo-
ple, you prefer the certain $100, even though the risky choice has the same  
 
 1. Paul A. Samuelson, Probability and the Attempts to Measure Utility, 1 KEIZAI 
KENKYU [ECONOMIC REVIEW] 167, 169-70 (1950) (footnote omitted). Samuelson notes in a 
footnote that “Ysidro’s father and mother had [Bernoulli-Marshall] functions, but he inherit-
ed a blend of them which is not such a function.” Id. at 170 n.5. Ysidro, as it turns out, could 
have been subject to a Dutch Book—that is, a series of bets, all of which he would accept, 
that would be guaranteed to lose him money—but Ysidro’s (or Samuelson’s) larger point 
still stands. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON, Postscript to Probability and the Attempts to Measure 
Utility, in 1 THE COLLECTED SCIENTIFIC PAPERS OF PAUL A. SAMUELSON 124, 124 (Joseph E. 
Stiglitz ed., 1966) (noting, in a postscript, that Leonard Savage had, upon reading Samuel-
son’s article, advised Samuelson that Ysidro could “make book against [himself] and end up 
making . . . money”). 
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expected value.2 Now imagine another choice: the coin flip game, which gives 
you an even chance at $50 or $150, or a different game, which will give you an 
unknown chance at $50 and an unknown chance at $150. Most people pick the 
coin flip, the game that features a known probability (that is, an even chance of 
winning), over the second game, which presents an unknown probability.3 The 
first choice, between $100 and a coin flip, tests how you feel about risk, that is, 
a known probability. The second choice, between the coin flip and the other 
game, tests how you feel about uncertainty, an unknown probability. 
A taxpayer trying to decide whether to comply with the tax law faces un-
certainty, not risk. He does not know whether he will be audited by the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), and perhaps he does not even know whether his tax po-
sition is correct as a matter of law. And he also does not know the chance that 
he will be audited, or the chance that his tax position is correct. If the IRS were 
rolling dice to determine whether to audit the taxpayer, the taxpayer would 
know the chance that he would be audited (assuming he knew that the IRS’s 
dice were not weighted). If, for example, rolling a pair of sixes would trigger 
an audit, the taxpayer would know that he had a 1 in 36 chance of being audit-
ed. He would not know how the roll of the dice would turn out, but he would 
know the chance that the roll would go against him. If a roll of the dice deter-
mined whether a taxpayer would be audited, and the taxpayer knew that, the 
taxpayer would be making a decision under risk—an unknown outcome with 
known probabilities.  
Rather, when the taxpayer decides whether to comply, he grapples with a 
decision more like the decision of how much to bet on the outcome of a foot-
ball game. Not only does the taxpayer not know who is going to win the foot-
ball game, but he also does not know with certainty the chance that a given 
team will win. And when the taxpayer decides whether to comply with the tax 
law, not only does he not know whether he will be audited and his position will 
be disallowed; he also does not know the chance that he will be audited and his 
position will be disallowed. The taxpayer’s decision whether to comply is thus 
a decision under uncertainty, an unknown outcome with unknown probabilities.  
Many people are averse to uncertainty, both in general4 and in the tax 
compliance context. For example, one experiment found that taxpayers are so 
uncertainty averse that “when low fines were combined with vague information 
about the probability of audits, the average percentage of reported income was 
 
 2. See infra Part I.C. 
 3. See infra Part III.B. 
 4. Colin Camerer & Martin Weber, Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: 
Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 325, 333-34 & tbl.3 (1992) (summa-
rizing a number of studies); see also, e.g., Ming Hsu et al., Neural Systems Responding to 
Degrees of Uncertainty in Human Decision-Making, 310 SCIENCE 1680, 1680 (2005) (find-
ing neurological evidence of ambiguity aversion). 
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quite close to that obtained when high fines were employed.”5 Low fines and 
uncertainty, that is, deterred cheating almost as much as high fines alone. Brain 
imaging studies show that different parts of the human brain activate when 
considering risk as opposed to uncertainty.6 Indeed, even apes7 and monkeys8 
have been shown to distinguish between risk and uncertainty, and to prefer risk 
to uncertainty.  
But while legal scholarship’s existing economic models of tax compliance 
can take risk and attitudes toward risk into account, they cannot incorporate at-
titudes toward uncertainty. By “model,” I mean a deductive argument from ex-
actly specified premises that deliberately simplify and omit facts about the 
world.9 To say that the models of tax compliance cannot take uncertainty into 
account is to say that nothing in the models can be adjusted to represent in-
creased (or decreased) uncertainty about the probability that a fine will be im-
posed, or to represent taxpayers’ attitudes toward uncertainty. It is not just that 
the models do not take uncertainty into account; rather, the models cannot take 
uncertainty into account.10  
This Article, in contrast, offers a formal model of tax compliance—what I 
call the uncertainty model—which takes into account both the taxpayer’s  
degree of uncertainty and the taxpayer’s attitude toward uncertainty. The  
 
 5. Nehemia Friedland, A Note on Tax Evasion as a Function of the Quality of Infor-
mation About the Magnitude and Credibility of Threatened Fines: Some Preliminary Re-
search, 12 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 54, 58 (1982). 
 6. E.g., Hsu et al., supra note 4, at 1680; Scott A. Huettel et al., Neural Signatures of 
Economic Preferences for Risk and Ambiguity, 49 NEURON 765, 765 (2006). 
 7. Alexandra G. Rosati & Brian Hare, Chimpanzees and Bonobos Distinguish Be-
tween Risk and Ambiguity, 7 BIOLOGY LETTERS 15, 15 (2011).  
 8. Benjamin Y. Hayden et al., Ambiguity Aversion in Rhesus Macaques, FRONTIERS 
NEUROSCIENCE, Sept. 17, 2010, at 1, 1. 
 9. See Allan Gibbard & Hal R. Varian, Economic Models, 75 J. PHIL. 664, 666 
(1978); Sarah Lawsky, How Models Work, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1657, 1660-63 (2012). How best 
to define “model” is a difficult question. See, e.g., Uskali Mäki, Realistic Realism About Un-
realistic Models, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS 68, 75 (Harold 
Kincaid & Don Ross eds., 2009).  
 10. Many articles address what they call tax law uncertainty, but those articles address 
unknown outcomes. In contrast, this Article focuses on uncertainty in the sense of unknown 
probabilities. See, e.g., James Alm, Uncertain Tax Policies, Individual Behavior, and Wel-
fare, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 237, 237 (1988); Paul J. Beck & Woon-Oh Jung, Taxpayer Com-
pliance Under Uncertainty, 8 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1 (1989); Mark P. Gergen, Uncer-
tainty and Tax Enforcement: A Case for Moderate Fault-Based Penalties, 64 TAX L. REV. 
453, 453 (2011); Kyle D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law Is 
Uncertain, 27 VA. TAX REV. 241, 241 (2007); Leigh Osofsky, The Case Against Strategic 
Tax Law Uncertainty, 64 TAX L. REV. 489, 489-91 (2011); Suzanne Scotchmer & Joel 
Slemrod, Randomness in Tax Enforcement, 38 J. PUB. ECON. 17, 17 (1989); David A. 
Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax-Avoidance Doctrines, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
88, 105-08 (2002); see also Matthew D. Adler & Chris William Sanchirico, Inequality and 
Uncertainty: Theory and Legal Applications, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 285 (2006) (discussing 
uncertainty and providing an example of uncertainty as an unknown outcome with known 
probabilities). 
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uncertainty model imagines that taxpayers determine whether to comply with 
tax law based not only on the fine that could be imposed, the probability of that 
fine, and the taxpayer’s feelings about risk (unknown outcomes), but also based 
on how sure the taxpayer is about the probabilities he assigns to various out-
comes, and how the taxpayer feels about unknown probabilities. The model 
provides new insights into a variety of contentious problems in tax law and pol-
icy, including how the government should reveal information about its ap-
proach to audits, whether the government should use anti-abuse rules to attack 
tax shelters, and whether tax professionals should be subject to penalties for 
providing unsupported tax advice. 
Several scholars outside the legal academy have empirically studied tax-
payer attitudes toward uncertainty,11 but only a few legal scholars even take 
into account that the decision whether to comply with the tax law is a decision 
under uncertainty.12 In other areas of the law, especially criminal law and tort 
law, some legal scholars have begun to investigate uncertainty and uncertainty 
aversion using a combination of theoretical, empirical, and doctrinal  
approaches.13 (The recent financial crisis may have piqued general interest in 
unknown probabilities, as some believe that the crisis was due in part to mis-
taking uncertainty for risk, unknown for known probabilities.)14 Unlike most 
legal scholarship that addresses uncertainty, however, this Article focuses on 
formal modeling, rather than empirical studies or a more intuitive (which is not 
to say any less valuable) analysis. 
 
 11. See, e.g., James Alm et al., Institutional Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance, 82 
AM. ECON. REV. 1018 (1992); Jeff T. Casey & John T. Scholz, Boundary Effects of Vague 
Risk Information on Taxpayer Decisions, 50 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 360 (1991); Friedland, supra note 5, at 58; Michael W. Spicer & J. Everett 
Thomas, Audit Probabilities and the Tax Evasion Decision: An Experimental Approach, 2 J. 
ECON. PSYCHOL. 241 (1982). The study reported in Dipankar Ghosh & Terry L. Crain, Struc-
ture of Uncertainty and Decision Making: An Experimental Investigation, 24 DECISION SCI. 
789 (1993), involves a known mean and a known distribution, which in my terminology is 
risk, not uncertainty. This Article, in other words, addresses the “narrowly defined” version 
of uncertainty referred to in Ghosh and Crain’s article. See id. at 799.  
 12. Two exceptions are Terrence R. Chorvat, Ambiguity and Income Taxation, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 617, 618-19 (2002), and Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax 
Law’s Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1017, 1017-18 (2009). 
 13. See, e.g., Tom Baker et al., The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental 
Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443, 445 (2004); Shawn J. Bayern, Rational Ignorance, Ration-
al Closed-Mindedness, and Modern Economic Formalism in Contract Law, 97 CALIF. L. 
REV. 943, 960-68 (2009); Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of 
the Twenty-First Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 10-11 (1998); Uzi Segal & Alex Stein, Am-
biguity Aversion and the Criminal Process, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1495 (2006); Er-
ic L. Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Contractual Conditions, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
755, 755 (2009). 
 14. See, e.g., Rafael Ramirez, Op-Ed., Five Overlooked Global Risks, REUTERS (Sept. 
15, 2009), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2009/09/15/five-overlooked-global-risks 
(“The . . . perhaps most important risk . . . is confusing categories of ignorance. This most 
centrally is about confusing risk with uncertainty.”). 
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Only three pieces of legal scholarship have incorporated any of the signifi-
cant amount of scholarship outside of legal academia on formal modeling of 
uncertainty. First, Daniel Farber has applied formal modeling of uncertainty to 
propose a new approach to environmental policymaking.15 Second, Eric Talley 
has investigated material adverse event clauses in contracts using an uncertain-
ty modeling framework.16 The current Article takes a different approach to 
modeling uncertainty than either Farber or Talley.17 Finally, Joshua Teitelbaum 
has modeled uncertainty in tort law using the same approach as this Article: 
Choquet expected utility with neoadditive capacities.18  
After this Introduction, Part I describes three approaches to modeling tax 
compliance and how scholars have used these models. Part II proposes a new 
model for tax compliance—the uncertainty model—that, unlike any other mod-
el of tax compliance in legal scholarship, takes uncertainty into account. Part 
III explores the benefits and practical consequences of the new model: the in-
formation it gives us that we can incorporate into our understanding of the law, 
the questions it raises that might lead to useful empirical work, and problems 
with translating the model directly into law. 
I. THREE MODELS OF TAX COMPLIANCE 
This Part considers three models that scholars and policymakers use to un-
derstand why taxpayers comply with the tax law and how to increase tax com-
pliance. The first model, the simple cost-benefit model, posits a taxpayer who 
weighs the cost in dollars of complying (tax owed) against the cost in dollars of 
not complying (tax owed plus fine owed). This model is not generally used in 
scholarship, though it might be used by unsophisticated individuals who are 
deciding whether to take a particular tax position. The second model, the ex-
pected value model, is the most common model in tax legal scholarship. It also 
imagines that each taxpayer compares costs in dollars, but discounts each pos-
sible dollar outcome by the probability of that outcome. The third model, the 
expected utility model, is common in economic scholarship and has been in-
corporated into some policy documents. It posits a taxpayer who compares the 
 
 15. Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 901 (2011). 
 16. Talley, supra note 13, at 755 (showing how ambiguity aversion can shed light on 
certain contractual terms). 
 17. Farber uses the α-maxmin approach, which involves weighting the best possible 
outcome and the worst possible outcome. See Farber, supra note 15, at 919, 930. Talley uses 
maxmin expected utility, which takes into account only the worst possible outcome. See Tal-
ley, supra note 13, at 778. The approach in the current Article involves, as explained further 
below, weighting the best possible outcome, the worst possible outcome, and the expected 
value. 
 18. Joshua C. Teitelbaum, A Unilateral Accident Model Under Ambiguity, 36 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 431, 431 (2007). To my knowledge, although Teitelbaum did not invent Choquet ex-
pected utility or Choquet expected utility with neoadditive capacities, Teitelbaum’s article is 
the first in legal scholarship to use this model. 
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expected utility of various outcomes, not the expected dollar amount; this mod-
el, unlike the expected value model, can take into account taxpayers’ attitudes 
towards risk.  
One cannot, of course, determine in the abstract how useful a given model 
is to legal scholars and policymakers. A particular model may be useful for one 
sort of question but not for another. Nonetheless, better to understand when a 
given model may be useful, this Part evaluates each model on three criteria: the 
model’s accuracy, the extent to which it directs legal scholarship, and its sim-
plicity.19 
First, a model may be more useful to legal scholars for certain purposes the 
more accurately it describes the world. For example, a more accurate model 
might help policymakers calibrate penalty and audit levels. One way to demon-
strate the accuracy of a model is to show that an element of the model corre-
sponds to a fact in the world—for example, that people’s behavior in reality 
corresponds to the model’s assumptions about behavior. Another way to show 
that a model is accurate is to show that it correctly predicts outcomes—in our 
case, predicts the extent to which people comply with the tax law. Second, a 
model can be useful if it focuses scholars’ attention on factors that are suscep-
tible to change, or suggests areas that should be further studied. Such a model 
is not somehow intrinsically better than a model that focuses on immutable or  
unreachable factors; it is more useful to legal scholars, however, to the extent 
that legal scholars are interested in critiquing or amending the law. Finally, a 
simpler model is, all else equal, better for legal scholars and policymakers,  
because it is easier to understand and to use.20 
These three criteria do not, of course, always point in the same direction. 
For example, a model that reflects many facts in the world and is therefore very 
accurate would also be complex, perhaps to the point of being unworkable. 
And there is no particular weight one can assign to each factor to determine 
that one model is somehow “better” than another in the abstract; the correct 
balance among the factors depends on, among other things, how the model is to 
be used. But these factors are nonetheless useful as a framework for comparing 
different models. 
 
 19. These are preliminary criteria for evaluating a legal model. In contrast to other ar-
eas, such as economics, little scholarship explicitly addresses the philosophy of modeling in 
legal scholarship. For further discussion, see Lawsky, supra note 9, at 1668-83. 
 20. See, e.g., Gibbard & Varian, supra note 9, at 672 (“When economic models are 
used . . . to explain casually observable features of the world, it is important that one be able 
to grasp the explanation. Simplicity . . . will be a highly desirable feature of such models. 
Complications to get as close as possible a fit to reality will be undesirable if they make the 
model less possible to grasp.”). 
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A. Simple Costs and Benefits 
1. The model  
Perhaps the simplest way to think about the taxpayer’s choice whether to 
comply is to think of him as comparing dollars to dollars, comparing what the 
law says the taxpayer will pay if he complies to what the law says he will pay if 
he does not comply. I call this the simple cost-benefit model. Take, for exam-
ple, a taxpayer, Henry, who has pretax income (I) of $100 and is trying to  
decide whether to pay a $40 tax (T). If he does not pay the tax and is caught, he 
will owe the tax plus a $10 fine (F). In the simple cost-benefit model, Henry 
compares $40, the tax he will owe, with the number of dollars the law tells him 
he will have to pay if he does not comply—in our example, $50, the tax plus 
the fine.21 Henry would prefer to pay as little to the government as possible, so 
he will choose to pay his tax. In the simple cost-benefit model, any fine will be 
enough to get a taxpayer to comply. 
Symbolically, Henry will comply whenever he will have more money after 
paying the tax than after paying the tax together with the fine. That is, he will 
comply whenever 
 
 I − T > I − T − F (1) 
 
Obviously, this implies that a taxpayer will comply whenever F > 0.  
2. Evaluating the model 
The simple cost-benefit model (represented in Equation 1) may be useful 
in some contexts. Law enforcement, for example, sometimes encourages peo-
ple to make decisions without discounting penalties by probabilities. An ad that 
used to play over the speakers in Washington, D.C., Metro stations asked 
whether eating a candy bar on the subway was worth $100, the fine for eating 
on the subway. Of course, the ex ante cost of eating the candy bar was better 
considered to be $100 discounted by the (extremely low) probability of the fine 
being imposed. 
Notwithstanding its potential use as a device to encourage compliance 
through misinformation, the simple cost-benefit model is limited in a number 
of ways. This model is not terribly accurate: it does not describe how taxpayers 
actually make decisions because, in general, taxpayers do discount outcomes 
 
 21. We can set aside that he pays interest, as the interest serves, at least in theory, 
simply to make him indifferent to the time of his payment—that is, to remove any advantage 
that would stem from delaying the tax. 
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by probabilities, at least to some extent.22 The simple cost-benefit model also 
does not accurately predict when people will comply with the tax law, because 
it predicts that everyone will comply whenever penalties are greater than zero, 
which is clearly false.  
The simple cost-benefit model does capture the important idea that taxpay-
ers weigh costs and benefits when determining whether to comply, but aside 
from that, the simple cost-benefit model focuses one’s attention only on wheth-
er the fine is nonzero. That is, although the size of the fine is susceptible to 
change, the only change this model suggests is that penalties should be greater 
than zero.  
Finally, the simple cost-benefit model is, as its name suggests, simple, but 
perhaps too simple. It is nearly useless for those who wish to improve tax com-
pliance, because it gives so little information about how to structure penalties 
and shape detection efforts and does not direct researchers’ efforts.  
B. Expected Value 
1. The model 
A more sophisticated model envisions a taxpayer who not only weighs 
costs and benefits, but also weights each possible outcome by the probability of 
that outcome. Consider a taxpayer who is weighing a tax position that would 
allow him to avoid paying a particular tax. If the taxpayer does not take this tax 
position, he will, under the expected value model, pay the tax (T) which reduc-
es his pretax income (I) so that after tax, he has total income of I − T. If he does 
take the position, he might be audited or he might not be audited; if he is audit-
ed, his position might or might not be detected by the authorities; and, if the 
position is detected, it might or might not be upheld. Call the probability of the 
bad outcome p (bad from the taxpayer’s perspective), where p combines all the 
relevant probabilities, including the chance that the IRS will audit the taxpayer, 
the chance that if the IRS audits the taxpayer, it will detect and challenge his 
position, and the chance that if the IRS detects and challenges his position, a 
court will ultimately strike down the position.23 
If the IRS detects and successfully challenges his position, the taxpayer 
must pay not only the correct amount of tax (T) but also a fine (F). If the posi-
tion is successful—is not struck down—he will pay no tax at all. That is, if he 
 
 22. See, e.g., Kurt J. Beron et al., The Effect of Audits and Socioeconomic Variables 
on Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 67, 80 
(Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (finding that increasing the probability of an audit generally in-
creases tax compliance, but that elasticity is less than one). 
 23. If the probability of the bad outcome is p, the probability of the good outcome will 
be (1 – p), because either the good outcome or the bad outcome will occur—that is, the 
probability of the two outcomes must, in this model, add to 1, or 100%. Probabilities do not 
add to 100% in all models, as discussed further below in Part II.A. 
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takes the position, he expects to have income equal to p(I − T − F) + (1 − p)(I), 
because he weights each possible outcome by the probability of that outcome. 
The taxpayer will therefore comply when  
 
 I − T > p(I − T − F) + (1 − p)(I) (2) 
 
which can also be stated  
 
 pF > (1 − p)(T)  (2a) 
 
Put another way, imagine the taxpayer is starting at I − T, his pretax  
income less his tax owed. If he cheats and doesn’t get caught, he is better off by 
T, because he doesn’t have to pay the tax. If he cheats and does get caught, he 
is worse off by F, because he has to pay the fine. The chance of getting caught 
is p, and the chance of not getting caught is (1 – p), so he weights the respec-
tive outcomes by those amounts.  
Return to Henry, the taxpayer with pretax income of $100, tax owed of 
$40, and a possible fine of $10. Say that the probability of the bad outcome for 
Henry—the chance that Henry’s position will be detected and struck down—is 
75%. In this example, if Henry complies, he knows for sure that he will have 
$60 ($100, his income, less $40, the tax he will have to pay). If he does not 
comply, he has a 75% chance of having to pay the fine in addition to the tax, 
and a 25% chance of having to pay the government nothing at all. So his  
expected value of not complying is  
 
 75% × ($100 − $40 − $10) + 25% × ($100) = $62.50 
 
Because the expected value of complying ($60) is less than the expected 
value of not complying ($62.50), in this model, Henry will not comply.  
(Equivalently, using Equation 2a, we know Henry will not comply because the 
probability of getting caught multiplied by the bad outcome (paying the fine) is 
75% × $10 = $7.50, which is less than the probability of not getting caught 
multiplied by the good outcome (keeping the tax), 25% × $40 = $10.) 
2. Evaluating the model 
Like the simple cost-benefit model (Equation 1), the expected value model 
(as represented in Equations 2 and 2a) is not particularly accurate. While peo-
ple do tend to discount outcomes by probabilities,24 the expected value model 
 
 24. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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does not actually predict compliance well, as many scholars have noted.25 The 
probability of detection and rate of penalties are so low that the expected value 
model predicts that nobody should voluntarily comply with tax law.26 The  
current audit rate for individuals is approximately 1%,27 and the usual fine for 
underpayment is 20% of the underpayment.28 In our example, the taxpayer is 
supposed to pay T but pays nothing, so the penalty (F) is 20% of T, or 0.2(T). 
The audit rate is 1%, and not all audited returns result in penalties,29 so it is an 
overstatement to say that p is 1% (that is, saying p is 1% leans too strongly in 
favor of compliance). Even given this generous overstatement, though, the  
expected value model predicts that nobody will comply. A taxpayer should 
comply only if 
 
 I − T > p(I − T − F) + (1 − p)(I) 
 
Or, equivalently,  
 
 pF > (1 − p)(T) 
 
 Using the values noted above for p and F, 
 
 (0.01) × (0.2T) > (1 − 0.01)(T) 
 0.002T > 0.99T 
 
This is clearly false, so the taxpayer in this model will not comply. 
 
Of course, the relevant probability is not the actual audit rate, but rather the 
perceived audit rate—what the taxpayer believes the audit rate to be.30 But 
even if we assume that, as a number of studies suggest, the taxpayer wildly 
overestimates the probability that the bad tax position will be apprehended and 
 
 25. See, e.g., Christopher C. Fennell & Lee Anne Fennell, Fear and Greed in Tax Pol-
icy: A Qualitative Research Agenda, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 75, 82-84 (2003); Sarah B. 
Lawsky, Fairly Random: On Compensating Audited Taxpayers, 41 CONN. L. REV. 161, 187-
88 (2008); Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Com-
pliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1457-59, 1464 (2003); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social 
Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1783 (2000). 
 26. See, e.g., Lederman, supra note 25, at 1464-65. 
 27. See, e.g., IRS, Publication 55B, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 2011, at 
26 tbl.9b (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/11databk.pdf (stating that the 
overall audit rate for 2011 was 1.11%). 
 28. See 26 U.S.C. § 6662 (2011). 
 29. See, e.g., IRS, supra note 27, at 42 tbl.17 (providing information about civil penal-
ties from fiscal year 2011). 
 30. See, e.g., Lawsky, supra note 12, at 1041 (explaining that tax compliance probabil-
ities are best given a subjectivist, rather than a frequentist, interpretation). 
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struck down, the expected value model still predicts that nobody will comply. 
Assume the taxpayer believes, as studies suggest,31 that p is 50%. Under the 
expected value model, the taxpayer complies only if he believes that the fine 
would equal more than 100% of the tax owed: that is, that if he cheats and is 
apprehended, he will have to pay twice the tax he would have owed had he 
complied. No civil penalty in our system is this harsh (the harshest civil penalty 
for income tax offenses is for fraud, and that equals only 75% of tax underpaid 
attributable to fraud32). 
The expected value model fails to predict compliance in part because it 
omits many factors that affect whether people comply with the tax law, includ-
ing, for example, compliance costs, attitudes towards tax authorities, and non-
monetary costs and benefits of complying with the law. Nonetheless, although 
the expected value model is not particularly good at predicting tax compliance, 
it is superior to the simple cost-benefit model in some ways, because the  
expected value model directs scholars to an additional factor that is susceptible 
to change: the probability that the position will be struck down. Unlike the  
simple cost-benefit model, which implies only that the fine should be greater 
than zero, the expected value model suggests that certain combinations of  
penalties and probabilities of detection are too low. Scholars and policymakers 
can thus use the expected value model to propose ways to increase penalties, or 
increase probabilities of detection, or both. 
More specifically, the legal literature on tax compliance tends to rely on 
the expected value model for three important insights. First, like the simple 
cost-benefit model, the expected value model counsels that penalties should be 
structured to take into account that taxpayers weigh costs and benefits when 
deciding whether to comply with tax law. Second, the expected value model 
(but not the simple cost-benefit model) suggests that increasing penalties  
increases compliance. Third, the expected value model suggests that if all else 
is equal, taxpayers will tend to comply more as the probability that their posi-
tion will be struck down increases—that is, that taxpayers consider expected 
penalties rather than nominal penalties, by discounting nominal penalties by the 
chance that they will escape detection.  
Kyle Logue, for example, examines a rational, risk-neutral actor who faces 
no external sanctions against tax noncompliance. He says that such a person 
would decide whether to comply based on “the probability that the particular 
tax question . . . will be discovered and . . . if detected . . . rejected by the 
[IRS],” and on “the size of the penalty.”33 Logue presents a number of exam-
ples of taxpayers deciding whether to engage in a particular transaction by 
 
 31. See, e.g., John T. Scholz & Neil Pinney, Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The 
Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behavior, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 490, 497-98 (1995) (finding a 
perceived probability of around 48%). 
 32. See 26 U.S.C. § 6663(a). 
 33. Logue, supra note 10, at 245. 
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comparing the expected value, in dollars, of not engaging in the transaction 
with the expected value, in dollars, of engaging in the transaction.34 The  
important insight, Logue explains, is that “the lower the probability of detec-
tion . . . the larger the incentive that taxpayers have to take aggressive tax posi-
tions.”35 He uses this insight to propose a strict liability regime for tax penal-
ties. He discusses risk aversion only briefly.36 
Similarly, Alex Raskolnikov relies on the expected value model to propose 
a novel approach to structuring tax penalties. Raskolnikov notes that it is an 
obvious and “critical” flaw in our tax penalty system that the IRS determines 
whom to audit in part based on “red flags” on tax returns, because taxpayers, 
knowing this, choose to evade tax in ways that do not raise red flags.37 Tax-
payers are able to decrease the probability that the penalty will be imposed, 
which in turn decreases their expected penalty, which in turn makes them less 
likely to comply with tax law.38 Raskolnikov thus suggests a “self-adjusting 
penalty,” which would increase as taxpayers made their cheating more difficult 
to detect by hiding an illegitimate deduction within legitimate deductions.39 In 
particular, if a taxpayer takes an illegitimate deduction, he would lose a portion 
of his legitimate deduction of the same type. The basis for Raskolnikov’s ap-
proach is, as he explains, Gary Becker’s insight that “when rational utility-
maximizers decide whether to violate the law, they take into account not the 
nominal penalties (i.e., the sanctions set forth in the statute), but the expected 
ones . . . [which equal] the nominal penalty discounted by the probability that 
the penalty will be imposed.”40 Like Logue, Raskolnikov briefly addresses how 
his proposal would interact with risk aversion, but his main insight does not 
depend on attitudes toward risk.41 
Finally, the expected value model is quite simple. The expected value 
model is slightly more complex than the simple cost-benefit model, because the 
expected value model adds probabilities to the mix, but this does not make the 
model unworkable. The predominance of the expected value model in legal 
scholarship suggests that the slight increase in complexity is, for legal scholars, 
more than outweighed by the expected value model’s other benefits. 
 
 34. Id. at 265, 267. 
 35. Id. at 265-66. 
 36. Id. at 267, 270. 
 37. Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and 
the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 593-94 (2006). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 571-73. 
 40. Id. at 576. 
 41. Id. at 635-39. 
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C. Expected Utility 
1. The model 
The expected utility model of tax compliance is common in economic 
modeling and is also sometimes used by policymakers.42 This model posits a 
taxpayer who compares not the absolute amount of dollars he will receive, but 
rather the utility of those dollars to him.43 (“Utility” here means, very roughly 
speaking, something that, when the taxpayer has it, he is better off.)44 
Whatever the correct definition of utility, the expected utility model  
imagines that the taxpayer compares the expected utility of complying to the 
expected utility of not complying, and complies when complying has a higher 
expected utility than not complying. In the expected utility model, utility is 
usually a function either of consumption and leisure or sometimes just of  
consumption, which is represented by income. In the expected utility model’s 
simplest version, where utility is a function only of income, and a taxpayer’s 
utility is represented by U(*), the taxpayer complies when 
 
 U(I − T) > pU(I − T − F) + (1 − p)U(I) (3) 
 
 
 42. In one report, for example, the Joint Committee on Taxation identified a variety of 
factors that could influence whether a taxpayer complied, including the probability of detec-
tion, the benefit to the taxpayer of not complying, penalties and other costs imposed if the 
IRS identified the taxpayer’s position, and the taxpayer’s level of risk aversion. JOINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-3-9, STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS 
AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3801 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND 
REFORM ACT OF 1998 (INCLUDING PROVISIONS RELATING TO CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS) 31 
(1999). 
 43. This approach was introduced in Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income 
Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323 (1972); the model presented here 
is a version of their simplest model. This analysis can be complicated in any number of 
ways. If the position the taxpayer is considering is clearly against the tax law, the utility 
function could be expanded to include not only the possible monetary cost of noncompli-
ance, but also the emotional cost, if any, of not complying; a taxpayer might have a taste for 
fairness that would be offended if he does not comply with the tax law. See, e.g., Lawsky, 
supra note 25, at 189-94. Or complying might impose compliance costs, which would re-
duce the benefit of complying. Some have taken into account that the fine that the taxpayer 
may bear depends in part on the chance that the position is, as a matter of law, a good posi-
tion. See, e.g., Lawsky, supra note 12, at 1021. These variations and many more have been 
considered by any number of scholars. The model at the core of these variations remains the 
same, however: comparing expected utility. 
 44. There are a variety of possible definitions of utility. Some people, for example, be-
lieve that utility is equivalent to preference satisfaction; others hold the view that utility 
equals happiness. See Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax 
Policy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 904, 911-12 (2011) (discussing various possible definitions of 
utility). Happily, this project does not depend on embracing a particular definition of utility. 
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Again, take as an example Henry, the taxpayer who has pretax income of 
$100 and is trying to decide whether to pay a $40 tax. If Henry does not pay the 
tax and is caught, he will owe a $10 fine. The chance that he will be caught is 
75%. Under the expected utility model, Henry compares his utility if he pays 
the tax, U(100 − 40), to his utility if he does not pay the tax, 75% ×  
U(100 − 40 − 10) + 25% × U(100). Thus, Henry will pay the tax if  
 
 U(60) > 75% × U(50) + 25% × U(100) 
 
To evaluate this inequality, we must pick a way to evaluate Henry’s utility 
function. In the expected utility model, a taxpayer’s utility function is often 
taken to be the natural log of the taxpayer’s income, probably because natural 
log is an easy function to work with and represents a person who has declining 
marginal utility, a popular assumption.45 The expected utility model would thus 
tell us in this scenario that Henry would pay the tax, because his expected utili-
ty of complying is greater than his expected utility of not complying: 
 
 ln(60) > 75% × ln(50) + 25% × ln(100) 
 4.094 > 4.085 
 
The expected utility model gives a different prediction than did the  
expected value model. If Henry compares the expected utility of complying 
with the expected utility of not complying, he will choose to comply. Recall, 
however, that when Henry compared the expected value of complying and not 
complying, rather than the expected utility, he chose not to comply. As noted 
above, the expected value of complying is $60, but the expected value of not 
complying is $62.50: 75% × $50 + 25% × $100. Considering expected utility, 
as opposed to expected value, can, in some cases, change the model’s predic-
tions.  
Why might Henry prefer complying to not complying, even though he  
expects more income from not complying? In the expected utility model where 
utility is a function solely of income, there is only one reason that Henry would 
make such a choice: he is risk averse. He prefers to get $60 for sure, rather than 
getting a chance at $50 and a chance at $100. He prefers to know the outcome 
of his choice with certainty, rather than facing risk. As the above example sug-
gests, risk aversion is captured by the taxpayer’s utility function. A taxpayer 
whose utility function has declining marginal utility, for whom the next dollar 
is worth less than the last dollar, will act as if he is risk averse.46 That people 
have declining marginal utility is intuitively and perhaps morally appealing to 
 
 45. For speculation as to why people prefer to assume that people have declining mar-
ginal utility, see generally id. The natural log represents a taxpayer with declining marginal 
utility because the second derivative of the natural log is always negative. Id. at 915 n.46. 
 46. Id. at 916. 
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many,47 and has some empirical support, so individuals are usually taken to be 
risk averse in the expected utility model.48 (Of course, all this involves many 
assumptions, including but not limited to the assumptions that individuals’ util-
ity can be measured; that individuals have declining marginal utility; that de-
clining marginal utility and risk aversion are equivalent; and that individuals’ 
utility curves are best represented by a natural log curve. I accept all of these 
here as parts of a model, not because I accept that they are accurate descrip-
tions of the real world.) 
Legal scholars are very familiar with the concept of utility; the legal litera-
ture on how best to structure a tax system is full of references to declining  
marginal utility and risk aversion.49 Indeed, the shape of an individual’s utility 
function is crucial to, among other things, the question of how progressive a tax 
system should be.50 Nonetheless, many legal scholars use an expected value 
model when considering compliance, rather than an expected utility model,  
either implicitly, by comparing dollars with dollars, or explicitly, by stating that 
the taxpayer in question is risk-neutral.51 
2. Evaluating the model 
The expected utility model has some advantages over the expected value 
model. The expected utility model can take into account people’s attitudes  
toward risk, and individuals are not, generally, risk-neutral.52 And for a range 
of probabilities, the expected utility model is better at prediction than is the  
expected value model.53 However, like the expected value model, the expected 
 
 47. Id. at 919-23. 
 48. Id. at 923-28. 
 49. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Struc-
ture: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905, 1947 (1987) (describing 
the “important . . . assumption[]” that consumption has declining marginal utility); Brian 
Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 67 (2009) (stating, when discussing “distribu-
tive fairness,” that “there is a diminishing marginal utility of wealth—a dollar is worth more 
to those who have fewer of them”); Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-
Take-All Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 32-39 
(1998) (discussing at length the assumption of declining marginal utility as a justification for 
progressive taxation); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 745, 756 (2007) (“Utilitarianism motivates redistribution from better-off to 
worse-off individuals through the assumption of diminishing marginal utility . . . .”). 
 50. See, e.g., Lawsky, supra note 44. 
 51. E.g., Daniel Shaviro, Disclosure and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. Legal Re-
sponse to Corporate Tax Shelters, in TAX AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 229, 239-40 
(Wolfgang Schön ed., 2008) (explicitly assuming risk neutrality when considering how pen-
alties should be structured). 
 52. See, e.g., Raj Chetty, A New Method of Estimating Risk Aversion, 96 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1821, 1829-31 (2006). 
 53. David W. Harless & Colin F. Camerer, The Predictive Utility of Generalized Ex-
pected Utility Theories, 62 ECONOMETRICA 1251, 1276-85 (1994). 
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utility model does not actually do a good job of predicting when people will 
comply with tax law. The expected utility model can, of course, explain  
compliance even if the expected value of complying is less than the expected 
value of not complying: people might still comply because, as in the above  
example, the expected utility of complying exceeds the expected utility of not 
complying. But the probability of detection and rate of penalties are so low 
that, in fact, the expected utility model would predict compliance only if  
individuals were extremely risk averse, far more so than any research would 
suggest they actually are.  
The expected utility model can accommodate attitudes toward risk, which 
affect how best to structure tax compliance. For example, Mark Gergen has 
found that adding an assumption of risk aversion makes fault-based penalties 
preferable to strict liability penalties,54 contrary to what other scholars have 
found when considering risk-neutral taxpayers.55 However, because the  
expected utility model is so inaccurate, attending to the details of individuals’ 
imagined utility functions does not allow lawmakers to fine-tune penalties or 
enforcement rates. 
Finally, the expected utility model is more complex than the expected  
value model because, unlike the expected value model, the expected utility 
model requires lawmakers and scholars to engage with the taxpayer’s utility 
function (or, equivalently, the taxpayer’s attitude toward risk). Given the other 
advantages of the expected utility model over the expected value model and the 
relatively sparse use of the expected utility model in legal scholarship on tax 
compliance, legal scholars seem to give significant weight to the expected utili-
ty model’s comparative (though still limited) complexity.  
II. THE UNCERTAINTY MODEL OF TAX COMPLIANCE 
This Part presents what I call the uncertainty model of tax compliance.56 
As described above, the expected utility model takes into account the taxpay-
 
 54. Gergen, supra note 10, at 453-54; see also Scotchmer & Slemrod, supra note 10, 
at 17-18 (showing that in their model, under certain assumptions, uncertain outcomes can 
increase compliance). 
 55. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 51, at 230-31. 
 56. The theory behind this model is not unique to this Article. Rather, this model fol-
lows Alain Chateauneuf et al., Choice Under Uncertainty with the Best and Worst in Mind: 
Neo-Additive Capacities, 137 J. ECON. THEORY 538 (2007), and Teitelbaum, supra note 18. 
However, this particular application of Choquet expected utility (CEU) with neoadditive ca-
pacities to tax compliance is unique to this Article. The one prior paper that applies CEU 
with neoadditive capacities to tax law, Jean-Louis Arcand et al., Who Would Benefit from 
Simplifying the Tax Code?: Frank Knight and Gustave Choquet Meet the Internal Reve-
nue Service (Centre d’Études et de Recherches sur le Développement  International (CERDI), 
Working Paper No. 2005-09, 2005), available at http://www.cerdi.org/uploads/ed/2006/ 
2006.35.pdf, takes a somewhat different, more complex approach; I indicate below the ex-
tent to which its analysis is relevant. 
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er’s perceived probability that his position will be struck down; the amount of 
the fine; the amount of tax that the taxpayer will pay if he does not take the  
position; and the taxpayer’s attitudes toward risk (as represented by the taxpay-
er’s utility function). The uncertainty model takes not only those four items in-
to account, but also incorporates both the taxpayer’s certainty about his posi-
tion and the taxpayer’s attitude toward uncertainty, or, equivalently, his 
optimism (or pessimism) about whether his position will be struck down. Sub-
part A explains the motivation behind the uncertainty model, and Subpart B 
outlines the uncertainty model’s details. 
A. Motivating the Uncertainty Model 
Legal scholarship’s models of tax compliance do not take into account how 
to interpret probabilities. The probability that a position will be struck down (p 
in the above examples) encompasses a number of probabilities—the chance of 
audit, the chance of detection, and the chance that the position will be struck 
down—and none of these probabilities is known. None of these probabilities is 
determined by a roll of the dice. The IRS keeps its methods of selection secret, 
so taxpayers cannot know their chances of audit. Some taxpayers are selected 
at random to be audited, but many more are selected because of some combina-
tion of characteristics on their tax return or because of a particular area of com-
pliance on which the IRS has chosen to focus. The chance that a position will 
be detected if the return is audited, and the chance that a particular tax position 
will be struck down, are also unknown probabilities.57 
Thus, to say that a transaction has a 40% chance of succeeding on the mer-
its does not mean that “if it were feasible and cost-justified to audit all 100,000 
taxpayers who engaged in this transaction, approximately 60,000 of the taxpay-
ers would be found to owe [additional taxes], and the other 40,000, nothing.”58 
Rather, the quantification of this probability reflects the speaker’s degree of  
belief. To say that a position has a 40% chance of succeeding on the merits is 
to make a statement about how strongly you believe that particular transaction 
is a good transaction. That is, the statement “a position has a 40% chance of  
succeeding” can be taken as equivalent to, “I would pay $40 to win $100 if this 
position succeeds.”59  
The expected utility model described above60 assumes that people assign 
probabilities to events, and that these probabilities can be represented by a  
single number. In the expected value and expected utility models of tax com-
pliance, probabilities add to 100%. If there is a 40% chance that a position will 
be upheld, then there is a 60% chance that it will be struck down. If tax proba-
 
 57. See Lawsky, supra note 12, at 1067-68. 
 58. Logue, supra note 10, at 288. 
 59. See Lawsky, supra note 12, at 1028-29. 
 60. See supra Part I.C. 
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bilities reflected how frequently each event would occur, then it would make 
sense that the probabilities should sum to 100%, as one or the other event 
would occur: the position will be upheld or struck down. For example, if there 
is a 1 in 36 chance that two rolled dice will add to 12, then there must be a 35 
in 36 chance that they will not, because there are only two options: the dice will 
add to 12, or the dice will not add to 12. If we roll the dice many, many times, 
we will see that some of those rolls add to 12, and some do not. When we  
consider 100% of the rolls, we will divide the total number into exactly two 
groups: rolls that added to 12, and rolls that did not. 
But, as economist and mathematician David Schmeidler famously noted, 
this approach does not seem to correspond to how people actually think about 
probabilities.61 The expected utility approach does not take into account how a 
person feels about the amount of information upon which he bases a given 
probability. Thus probabilities as people actually think of them may fail to fol-
low so-called rules of probabilities.62 Probabilities need not add to 100% when 
they reflect not the frequency of an event’s occurrence, but rather the degree of 
belief a person has about the chance that the event will occur. When a person 
does not like uncertainty—does not like not knowing probabilities—then the 
sum of the probability that an individual assigns to two events that are mutually 
exclusive (only one can happen) and exhaustive (one of the two must happen) 
can add to less than 100% if the person does not know the probability that each 
will occur. The missing part represents the person’s aversion to uncertainty or, 
put another way, the amount the person is willing to pay to avoid a situation 
with unknown probabilities. 
The Ellsberg paradox illustrates this point.63 Imagine two urns. Known 
Urn has 100 balls, 50 black and 50 red. Unknown Urn also has 100 balls, some 
red and some black, but the number of red and black balls, respectively, is  
unknown.64 
First, Picker is told that he must bet on red, but he can choose which urn to 
draw from. Research shows that most people would choose to draw from 
Known Urn.65 That is, most people would prefer to bet that a red ball will be 
drawn from Known Urn, rather than to bet that a red ball will be drawn from 
 
 61. David Schmeidler, Subjective Probability and Expected Utility Without Additivity, 
57 ECONOMETRICA 571, 572 (1989). 
 62. Cf. Samuelson, supra note 1 (illustrating that individuals’ preferences do not al-
ways conform to axioms that theoretically define individual preferences). 
 63. Itzhak Gilboa notes that Schmeidler’s critique was cognitive, and not based on be-
havioral examples such as the Ellsberg paradox, which exhibits certain symmetries that 
might allow for a “correction” of the problem, in particular resort to Laplace’s principle of 
insufficient reason. Itzhak Gilboa, Introduction to UNCERTAINTY IN ECONOMIC THEORY 3, 4-
5 (Itzhak Gilboa ed., 2004). Nonetheless, the Ellsberg paradox does provide, in Gilboa’s 
own terms, an “elegant illustration” of the problem at hand. Id. at 5. 
 64. See Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. ECON. 643, 
650-53 (1961). 
 65. See infra Part III.A. 
LAWSKY 65 STAN. L. REV. 241.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2013 3:23 PM 
260 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:241 
Unknown Urn. If Picker prefers to draw from Known Urn, he is acting as if the 
probability of drawing a red ball from Known Urn is greater than the probabil-
ity of drawing a red ball from Unknown Urn. 
Next, Picker is told he must bet on black. But again, he can choose which 
urn to draw from. And again, if Picker is like most people, he will prefer to 
draw from Known Urn. So Picker is acting as if the probability of drawing a 
black ball from Known Urn is greater than the probability of drawing a black 
ball from Unknown Urn. 
Picker would rather pick a red ball from Known Urn than a red ball from 
Unknown Urn, so he is acting like the probability of getting a red ball from 
Known Urn is greater than the probability of getting a red ball from Unknown 
Urn.66 He also would rather pick a black ball from Known Urn than a black 
ball from Unknown Urn. So Picker is also acting like the probability of picking 
a black ball from Known Urn is greater than the probability of picking a black 
ball from Unknown Urn.67 
If both of those are true, then Picker seems to believe that the probability 
of picking a red ball from Known Urn plus the probability of picking a black 
ball from Known Urn is greater than the probability of picking a red ball from 
Unknown Urn plus the probability of picking a black ball from Unknown 
Urn.68 
This is strange. If Picker draws a ball from Known Urn, the ball will either 
be black or it will be red. The two events are mutually exclusive and exhaus-
tive, so the probability of one or the other’s happening should equal 100%.69 
But the chance of drawing either a red ball or a black ball from Unknown Urn 
should also add to 100%. A ball from the Unknown Urn is also, after all, either 
red or black, either red or not-red.70 So it seems that the probability of picking 
either a red or black ball from Known Urn should equal the probability of pick-
ing either a red or black ball from Unknown Urn.71 In other words, if the prob-
ability of an event happening, plus the probability of an event not happening, 
really add up to 100%, Picker’s preferences violate one of Savage’s axioms of 
probability, the Sure Thing Principle.72 
Does this mean that Picker is wrong, that he is not rational? If we explain 
all this to Picker, will he see the error of his ways and change his mind?  
 
 66. That is, Picker is acting like Pr(Red from Known) > Pr(Red from Unknown). 
 67. Pr(Black from Known) > Pr(Black from Unknown). 
 68. Pr(Red from Known) + Pr(Black from Known) > Pr(Red from Unknown) + 
Pr(Black from Unknown). 
 69. Pr(Red from Known) + Pr(Black from Known) = 100%. 
 70. Pr(Red from Unknown) + Pr(Black from Unknown) = 100%. 
 71. Pr(Red from Known) + Pr(Black from Known) = Pr(Red from Unknown) + 
Pr(Black from Unknown). 
 72. See Ellsberg, supra note 64, at 651; see also LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 21-26 (1954) (introducing and explaining the Sure Thing Prin-
ciple). 
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Perhaps. Or perhaps Picker will stand firm in his decision, because Picker does 
not like uncertainty. (As discussed below, many people do stand firm.)73 He 
does not like having no information about the balls in Unknown Urn. He would 
prefer to bet less if he does not know the odds. He is, in short, uncertainty 
averse.74 
A person is uncertainty averse if, all else equal, he prefers to know the 
probabilities of the outcomes of choices he makes. Picker is uncertainty averse 
because he prefers to pick from an urn where he knows the contents, and thus 
the odds of each possible outcome, even though he does not know the outcome 
itself. A person could also prefer uncertainty; that person would prefer to pick 
from an urn where he did not know the contents and thus did not know the odds 
or the outcome.  
Tax compliance often involves unknown probabilities—uncertainty, not 
risk. Deciding whether to comply with tax law is more like picking from  
Unknown Urn than from Known Urn, and therefore attitudes toward uncertain-
ty may be relevant to whether people comply with the tax law. None of the  
current models of tax compliance, however, take attitudes toward uncertainty 
into account. 
B. The Uncertainty Model 
This Subpart proposes a model of tax compliance that incorporates atti-
tudes toward uncertainty. There are a number of approaches to modeling uncer-
tainty; this Article uses the approach known as Choquet expected utility (CEU) 
with neoadditive capacities.75 
The uncertainty model begins with the taxpayer’s expected utility, but  
expected utility does not necessarily determine the taxpayer’s overall utility in 
the uncertainty model. Instead, the taxpayer’s expected utility is given weight 
only to the extent the taxpayer is certain about the probability that his position 
 
 73. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 74. Uncertainty aversion (or, as it is sometimes called, ambiguity aversion) is not the 
same as risk aversion, and a model that takes into account risk aversion does not necessarily 
take into account uncertainty aversion. Picker might also be risk averse (we can’t tell from 
the above example, but many people are risk averse). A person is risk averse if, given known 
odds, he prefers knowing the outcome of an event to not knowing the outcome—that is, if he 
prefers not to have to deal with probabilities at all. In contrast, a person is uncertainty averse 
if, loosely speaking, given an unknown outcome, he prefers knowing the odds to not know-
ing the odds. Risk aversion can easily be included in the expected utility model, and indeed, 
as described above, that people are risk averse (and thus have concave utility curves) is usu-
ally one of the assumptions in the expected utility model. See supra note 48 and accompany-
ing text. Uncertainty aversion cannot be included in the expected utility model. 
 75. Choquet expected utility was introduced in Schmeidler, supra note 61. This ap-
proach is called “Choquet” expected utility because it relies on a definition of integral pro-
posed by Choquet. Id. at 580-81. CEU with neoadditive capacities was introduced in 
Chateauneuf et al., supra note 56, and applied to legal analysis in Teitelbaum, supra note 18, 
which modeled tort law. 
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will be successful. To the extent the taxpayer is uncertain about the probability 
that his position will be successful, his utility is determined by his feelings 
about uncertainty. 
The uncertainty model thus arrives at the taxpayer’s utility by combining 
two parts, the “certainty component” and the “uncertainty component.” The 
“certainty component” is just the taxpayer’s expected utility. If the taxpayer 
knows that his belief about the probability is correct, this component alone  
describes the taxpayer’s decisionmaking. The “uncertainty component” is the 
extra weight the taxpayer gives to a good (or bad) outcome. The certainty com-
ponent is weighted by the taxpayer’s certainty, and the uncertainty component 
is weighted by the taxpayer’s uncertainty. The two components are then added 
together to arrive at the taxpayer’s total CEU. 
If the taxpayer has no doubt about the probability that his position will be 
successful, the uncertainty model is identical to the expected utility model. 
Similarly, if the taxpayer is, in the face of uncertainty, neither optimistic nor 
pessimistic—if he overweights neither good outcomes nor bad outcomes when 
faced with uncertainty—the uncertainty model and the expected utility model 
are identical. If the taxpayer is not sure that his belief about his probability is 
correct, however, and the taxpayer (like many people76) overweights either 
good or bad outcomes, the expected utility model and the uncertainty model 
will not be identical. 
This Subpart explains the two components of the uncertainty model, the 
certainty component and the uncertainty component; how the two components 
are combined to arrive at the taxpayer’s CEU; and how the CEU of taking an 
uncertain tax position should be compared to the CEU of not taking that posi-
tion. 
1. The certainty component 
The uncertainty model begins with the taxpayer’s expected utility. In the 
best outcome (for the taxpayer), the taxpayer gets to keep all of his income (I), 
because he pays no tax. In the worst outcome, the taxpayer has income  
I − T − F; that is, he pays not only the tax, T > 0, but also a fine, F > 0. If the 
taxpayer takes a particular tax position and either is not audited or is audited 
and his position is upheld, he will have income I.  
The probability that the position will be struck down is p, which is meant 
to represent, as in both the expected value and expected utility models  
described above, the taxpayer’s belief,77 and each outcome is weighted by the 
probability that the outcome will occur. So, as described above, where the  
 
 76. See infra Part III.A. 
 77. See generally Lawsky, supra note 12, at 1023-24 (arguing that probabilities in the 
expected utility model as applied to tax compliance are best interpreted as degrees of belief). 
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taxpayer’s utility is U(*), the taxpayer’s expected utility of taking this position 
equals 
 
 pU(I − T − F) + (1 − p)U(I) = Expected Utility = Certainty Component 
 
This is the taxpayer’s expected utility, and also the certainty component of 
the uncertainty model. 
Because p, the probability of the bad outcome, is just the taxpayer’s belief 
about the probability of the outcome, the taxpayer may have reason to doubt 
the probability. Remember the two urns, Known and Unknown.78 Picker had 
no reason to think that Unknown Urn contained anything except an even mix of 
black and red balls, so he had no reason to assign anything but an even chance 
to drawing a red ball and drawing a black ball from that urn. But that did not 
mean that he felt the same certainty about these even odds as he did about the 
even odds of drawing a red ball from Known Urn, which he knew contained 50 
red balls and 50 black balls. 
In the uncertainty model, the taxpayer’s extent of doubt is represented by 
δ, where δ is between 0 and 1, inclusive.79 If δ = 0, the taxpayer feels no doubt 
about the probability he assigns to an event (for example, the taxpayer feels 
sure that there are 50 red and 50 black balls in the urn). His extent of certainty 
(his degree of confidence) is represented by the complement of his uncertain-
ty—that is, (1 − δ). The certainty component, his expected utility, is weighted 
by the extent of his certainty: 
 
 (1 − δ) × Expected Utility =  
 (1 − δ)[pU(I − T − F) + (1 − p)U(I)] 
 
If the taxpayer has no doubt about the probability he assigns to an event, 
the certainty component weighted by the taxpayer’s degree of confidence 
equals the taxpayer’s expected utility. If the taxpayer has doubt about this 
probability, the weighted certainty component is less than the taxpayer’s  
expected utility (because if δ > 0, then (1 − δ) < 1). 
2. The uncertainty component 
The uncertainty model next accounts for the taxpayer’s approach to  
unknown probabilities. In the uncertainty model, a taxpayer may be optimistic 
or pessimistic. “Optimistic” for these purposes means simply that the taxpayer 
tends to think that the best result is more likely to happen than its probability 
suggests; he overweights the good result. This is equivalent to preferring uncer-
 
 78. See supra Part II.A. 
 79. See Chateauneuf et al., supra note 56, at 541, 544. 
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tainty. If we say the taxpayer is pessimistic, we mean that he tends to think 
things are more likely to go badly than the probability he has assigned to events 
suggests; he overweights the bad result, which is equivalent to being uncertain-
ty averse.80 The extent of the taxpayer’s pessimism equals α, where α is  
between 0 and 1. If the taxpayer is completely pessimistic—that is, he thinks 
that all else being equal, the worst will happen—then α = 1. The taxpayer’s  
optimism is the complement of his pessimism, that is, his optimism equals  
(1 − α).81  
The uncertainty component equals the bad outcome, weighted by the ex-
tent of the taxpayer’s pessimism, plus the good outcome, weighted by the ex-
tent of the taxpayer’s optimism: 
 
 αU(I − T − F) + (1 − α)U(I) = Uncertainty Component 
 
The uncertainty component is relevant only to the extent of the taxpayer’s 
uncertainty, so it is weighted by his degree of uncertainty: 
 
δ × Uncertainty Component =  
δ[αU(I − T − F) + (1 − α)U(I)] 
3. Combining the components 
In the uncertainty model, the CEU of taking the tax position is the sum of 
the two weighted components:  
 
 CEU = (1 − δ) × Certainty Component + δ × Uncertainty Component = 
 (1 − δ)[pU(I − T − F) + (1 − p)U(I)] + δ[αU(I − T − F) + (1 − α)U(I)] (4) 
 
If the taxpayer feels complete certainty about his position, then the  
expected value model and the uncertainty model are the same. In the case of 
complete certainty, δ = 0, the uncertainty component drops out completely, and 
the weight given to the certainty component equals one: 
  
 (1 − δ)(pU(I − T − F) + (1 − p)U(I)) + δ[αU(I − T − F) + (1 − α)U(I)] = 
 (1 − 0)(pU(I − T − F) + (1 − p)U(I)) + 0[αU(I − T − F) + (1 − α)U(I)] = 
 
 80. Id. at 542 (“[I]t is straightforward to check that of two decision makers with the 
same beliefs and degrees of ambiguity . . . , the one with [more pessimism] is more ambigui-
ty-averse . . . .”). 
 81. I follow Teitelbaum, supra note 18, here in assigning α = 1 for complete pessi-
mism; Chateauneuf et al., supra note 56, assign α = 0 to pessimism. The Teitelbaum ap-
proach makes more sense for my purposes, because tax scholarship generally sets p to the 
probability of the tax position being struck down—that is, the probability of the bad event 
occurring. 
LAWSKY 65 STAN. L. REV. 241.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2013 3:23 PM 
February 2013] MODELING UNCERTAINTY IN TAX LAW 265 
 pU(I − T − F) + (1 − p)U(I) 
 
Because the certainty component equals the taxpayer’s expected utility, in 
the case of complete certainty, the two models are identical.  
If the taxpayer has some uncertainty about the probabilities he assigns to 
each outcome, the two models may be different, depending on how the taxpay-
er feels about uncertain outcomes. This is made clear by rewriting the sum of 
the weighted certainty component and the weighted uncertainty component as 
 
CEU = [δ(1 − α) + (1 − δ)(1 − p)]U(I) + [δα + (1 − δ)p]U(I − T − F) (4a) 
 
U(I) is the good outcome and U(I − T − F) is the bad outcome. The uncer-
tainty model thus weights the good outcome and the bad outcome differently 
than does the expected utility model. The expected utility model weights the 
good outcome by its probability, (1 − p), and the bad outcome by its probabil-
ity, p. The uncertainty model, in contrast, adjusts the weight given to the good 
and bad outcomes, respectively, by taking into account both the taxpayer’s  
degree of uncertainty and the taxpayer’s optimism or pessimism. 
The good outcome is weighted by (1 − p) only to the extent the taxpayer is 
certain of probability p. If the taxpayer is uncertain about this probability—is 
not sure that his belief is correct—the weight given to the good outcome may 
either increase or decrease, depending on whether the taxpayer is optimistic or 
pessimistic. If the taxpayer tends to overweight good outcomes when he makes 
a decision—to weight them more than the probability he has assigned to them 
would suggest—then the weight assigned to the good outcome will increase 
under the uncertainty model.82 That is, an optimistic taxpayer acts as if 
 
 δ(1 − α) + (1 − δ)(1 − p) > (1 − p) 
 
Similarly, a pessimistic taxpayer gives more weight to the bad outcome 
than the probability suggests he should; he acts as if  
 
 δα + (1 − δ)p > p 
 
The simplified sum makes obvious that the expected utility model (Equa-
tion 3) and the uncertainty model (Equations 4 and 4a) are the same if the tax-
payer is neither optimistic nor pessimistic. Saying that an optimistic taxpayer 
overweights the good outcome is saying that 
 
 δ(1 − α) + (1 − δ)(1 − p) > (1 − p) 
 
 82. See Teitelbaum, supra note 18, at 440 & n.20 for a discussion of the effect of 
overweighting on uncertainty modeling and for an explanation of the following equation. 
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which simplifies to  
  
 α < p 
 
The taxpayer is therefore optimistic if α < p. Through similar reasoning, 
the taxpayer is pessimistic if α > p. If the taxpayer overweights neither position, 
then α = p. Where α = p,  
 
[δ(1 − α) + (1 − δ)(1 − p)]U(I) + [δα + (1 − δ)p]U(I − T − F) = 
[δ(1 − p) + (1 − δ)(1 − p)]U(I) + [δp + (1 − δ)p]U(I − T − F) = 
(1 − p)U(I) + pU(I − T − F) = Expected Utility 
 
The uncertainty model provides different results than the expected utility 
model whenever the taxpayer is not certain of the probability he assigns to the 
outcome, and he is either optimistic or pessimistic (that is, he overweights good 
events or overweights bad events). 
4. Weighing outcomes 
Of course, a taxpayer deciding whether to take a tax position does not  
determine his utility in just one scenario. To decide whether to take a position, 
under the uncertainty model, the taxpayer compares the CEU of taking the  
position with the CEU of not taking the position.  
The CEU of not taking the position is straightforward if we assume that the 
position in question is the only doubtful transaction on the taxpayer’s return. If 
the taxpayer does not take the position, δ = 0 (and p = 0), because there is no 
uncertainty about his tax treatment, and the position will not be struck down. 
The best-case and worst-case scenarios are identical, as is his expected utility: 
that the taxpayer has income I − T. Therefore, his CEU equals 
 
[0(1 − α) + (1 − 0)(1 − 0)]U(I − T) + [0 + 1]U(I − T) = U(I − T) 
 
Under the uncertainty model, the taxpayer will take a tax position when the 
CEU of not taking the position is less than the CEU of taking the position, that 
is, when 
  
 U(I − T) < [δ(1 − α) + (1 − δ)(1 − p)]U(I) + [δα + (1 − δ)p]U(I − T − F) (5) 
5. A tax compliance example 
In the uncertainty model, tax compliance depends not only on the probabil-
ity that a position will be struck down and the amount of the fine, but also the 
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amount of uncertainty and the taxpayer’s pessimism (or optimism)—that is, his 
attitude toward uncertainty.  
In other words, to get the taxpayer not to take the position, the government 
should look for ways to reduce the right-hand side of Equation 5, above, so that 
the CEU of not complying is less than the CEU of complying. As discussed, in 
the expected utility model, the only ways to reduce the expected utility (as  
opposed to the CEU) of taking a tax position are to increase the probability that 
the position will be struck down; increase the fine to which the taxpayer will be 
subject if the position is struck down; or increase the riskiness of the position 
(that is, increase the variance). The uncertainty model highlights other reasons 
that a taxpayer might comply. As in the expected utility model, the utility of 
taking the position (that is, the right-hand side of the inequality) will, all else 
equal, decrease as the probability of detection, p, grows; the bigger p gets, the 
more weight is put on the worst-case scenario, the chance of having to pay both 
the tax and the fine. And of course the CEU of taking the position also decreas-
es as the fine increases. The CEU of taking the position can also change, how-
ever, as the level of uncertainty changes, or as a taxpayer’s attitude toward un-
certainty becomes more (or less) optimistic (or pessimistic).83 The uncertainty 
model suggests, therefore, that to increase tax compliance the government 
could adjust levels of uncertainty.  
The more pessimistic the taxpayer is, the more he will avoid taking the  
position. In the starkest case, complete pessimism, where α = 1, the best-case 
scenario is weighted by only (1 − δ)(1 − p), and the worst-case scenario is 
weighted by δ + (1 − δ)p = δ(1 − p) + p, which, obviously, exceeds p by 
δ(1 − p). Depending on how uncertain the situation is—how large δ is—the 
overweighting could be quite drastic indeed; as δ approaches 1, this weight also 
approaches 1. In complete uncertainty (not knowing anything about the colors 
of the balls in the urn), the extremely pessimistic taxpayer would not take the 
position at all, no matter how high he believed the probability of success was.  
Simply increasing uncertainty will not, however, necessarily result in more 
tax compliance, because taxpayers are not necessarily pessimistic. Some tax-
payers may even prefer uncertainty (though in general, as discussed below, 
people tend to be uncertainty averse). If a taxpayer is completely optimistic, he 
will weight the best-case scenario by δ + (1 − δ)(1 − p). In the case of complete 
optimism, α = 0, and complete uncertainty, δ = 1, the taxpayer will take the  
position no matter what; he will give full weight to the good outcome. 
Return to the example where Henry has income (I) of $100 and a possible 
tax (T) of $40, facing a potential $10 fine (F). As before, assume that Henry’s 
utility function is represented by the natural log of income, but now p, Henry’s 
 
 83. Although it is a possible solution, a policymaker looking for ways to reduce the 
right-hand side of the equation would probably not attempt to change taxpayers’ attitudes 
toward uncertainty; among other reasons, these attitudes may well be fixed. Taxpayers’ atti-
tudes are generally relevant, however, when considering whether taxpayers will comply. 
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assessment of the probability that his position will be struck down, is 65%,  
rather than 75%. In the expected utility model, Henry will not comply, because 
the expected utility of complying and paying the $40 tax, ln(60), is less than the 
expected utility of not complying: 
 
ln(60) < 65% × ln(50) + 35% × ln(100) 
4.094 < 4.155 
 
But Henry may not have enough information to feel certain about the 65% 
chance he assigns to the bad outcome. Perhaps he does not know audit rates, or 
does not fully understand the tax law, or there is no guidance on the position he 
is taking. And assume as well that Henry is pessimistic (or, equivalently, uncer-
tainty averse). The uncertainty model, unlike the expected utility model, can 
take Henry’s doubt or pessimism into account. Quantify Henry’s doubt, δ, as 
70%. Assume Henry moderately overweights bad outcomes, so that while he 
believes the probability of being caught is 65%, he overweights the chance of 
being caught. Quantify his pessimism as 80%. (Because 80% is greater than 
65%, he is pessimistic.) With these facts, the CEU of complying (4.094) is 
greater than the CEU of not complying (4.082): 
 
ln(60) > (1 − δ)[pU(I − T − F) + (1 − p)U(I)] + δ[αU(I − T − F) + (1 − α)U(I)] 
4.094 > (0.3)[0.65 × ln(50) + 0.35 × ln(100)] + (0.7)[0.8 × ln(50) + 0.2 × ln(100)] 
4.094 > 4.082 
 
 In the uncertainty model, therefore, the taxpayer will comply, a different 
result than under the expected utility model. 
III. THE UNCERTAINTY MODEL’S USEFULNESS FOR TAX LAW 
This Part investigates possible implications of the uncertainty model for 
shaping tax law and policy. Subpart A provides an overview of research on  
individuals’ attitudes toward uncertainty. Subpart B discusses the model’s  
implication that in some situations, the government should increase uncertainty 
to increase compliance. Subpart C considers whether uncertainty and attitudes 
toward uncertainty justify imposing penalties on tax advisors who recommend 
aggressive tax positions. Subpart D explains how the uncertainty model can 
guide researchers toward particular questions regarding taxpayers’ attitudes  
toward uncertainty that could help increase compliance. And, finally, Subpart E 
addresses the objection that the uncertainty model introduces too much  
complexity to be of use. 
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A. Attitudes Toward Uncertainty 
Because the uncertainty model depends not only on the degree of uncer-
tainty, but also on taxpayers’ attitudes toward uncertainty, the implications of 
the model for the real world depend on what those attitudes actually are.  
Research shows that many people are uncertainty averse.84 A variety of exper-
iments replicate the Ellsberg paradox,85 finding that people were willing to pay 
up to 70% of expected value in order to avoid uncertainty,86 while other studies 
confirm uncertainty aversion outside of the context of the Ellsberg paradox.87 
Studies also show that the Ellsberg paradox is not simply an error in judgment 
that will be corrected when someone explains “how probability works” to those 
who prefer known probabilities.88 
However, people appear to be more uncertainty averse when presented 
with both a certain and an uncertain option, as opposed to only an uncertain  
option.89 That is, when presented with a choice between a known and an  
unknown probability, individuals will prefer the known probability, but indi-
viduals do not discount unknown probabilities as much in the absence of a 
known probability. The Ellsberg paradox thus stands up to testing, because it 
asks people to choose between picking from Known Urn, an urn whose con-
tents they know, and Unknown Urn, whose contents they do not know. For  
example, in one study, subjects asked to price both picking from Known Urn 
and picking from Unknown Urn were willing to pay much more to pick from 
Known Urn: $24.34 for Known Urn, as opposed to $14.85 for Unknown Urn.90 
But when another group was asked to price picking from Known Urn, and a 
third, separate group was asked to price picking from Unknown Urn, the prices 
converged, and even flipped: the subjects were actually willing to pay slightly 
more to pick from Unknown Urn than from Known Urn ($18.42 for Unknown 
 
 84. See, e.g., Camerer & Weber, supra note 4, at 360; Hsu et al., supra note 4, at 1680, 
1682; Gideon Keren & Léonie E.M. Gerritsen, On the Robustness and Possible Accounts of 
Ambiguity Aversion, 103 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 149, 149 (1999) (“Ambiguity aversion is one 
of the most robust phenomena documented in the decision making literature . . . .”). 
 85. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 86. Camerer & Weber, supra note 4, at 333-34 & tbl.3 (summarizing a number of 
studies). 
 87. Id. at 340-41; see also, e.g., Hsu et al., supra note 4, at 1682 (finding neurological 
evidence of uncertainty aversion). 
 88. Camerer & Weber, supra note 4, at 337 (citing several studies on this point). 
 89. Craig R. Fox & Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance, 
110 Q.J. ECON. 585, 599 (1995). Fox and Tversky propose a difference framework for un-
derstanding their results, but arguably their “comparative ignorance” approach can be han-
dled by the same conceptual framework as ambiguity aversion. See, e.g., Horacio Arlo-Costa 
& Jeffrey Helzner, Comparative Ignorance and the Ellsberg Phenomenon, in PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON IMPRECISE PROBABILITIES AND THEIR 
APPLICATIONS 2-3, 8-9 (2005); Keren & Gerritson, supra note 84, at 169-70. 
 90. Fox & Tversky, supra note 89, at 588-89. 
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Urn as opposed to $17.94 for Known Urn).91 At least one other study has found 
that uncertainty aversion does not disappear entirely in the absence of an alter-
native choice with known probability, but that it does diminish.92  
Thus, as described further below, any implications of the uncertainty mod-
el should take into account both uncertainty aversion, when taxpayers are faced 
with a certain and uncertain option, and diminished uncertainty aversion when 
taxpayers are faced only with an uncertain option. 
B. Manipulating Uncertainty 
Because most people are uncertainty averse, the uncertainty model might 
seem to imply that the government could use uncertainty strategically to  
increase tax compliance.93 This approach may, however, be ineffective or un-
desirable in the real world in some situations, for reasons not immediately  
apparent from the model. 
To the extent that people are uncertainty averse, increasing taxpayers’  
uncertainty should also increase tax compliance, even if neither penalty levels 
nor actual audit frequency increases. As the example above suggests,94 in some 
situations, a taxpayer’s expected utility of not complying could exceed his  
expected utility of complying, but with sufficient uncertainty (and sufficient 
uncertainty aversion), the outcome could flip, and the CEU of complying could 
exceed the CEU of not complying. In other words, with sufficient uncertainty 
and uncertainty aversion, a taxpayer will comply even if the expected utility 
model (as opposed to the uncertainty model) suggests that he will not comply. 
However, if uncertainty is to help increase compliance, there must be  
another choice for the taxpayer that permits him to avoid uncertainty, or at least 
face lower uncertainty. The taxpayer in the example above did not choose to 
comply with the tax law simply because the tax law was uncertain. Rather, he 
chose to comply because if he complied (chose not to take the position), he 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. In Clare Chua Chow & Rakesh K. Sarin, Comparative Ignorance and the Ellsberg 
Paradox, 22 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 129 (2001), the authors reported a study finding that 
subjects were willing to pay $33.17 for a certain bet and $25.05 for an uncertain bet in a 
comparative condition, and $30.12 for a certain bet and $25.59 for an uncertain bet in a 
noncomparative condition. Id. at 133-34. The authors noted that “[t]he key finding that 
emerges from our experiments is that comparison enhances the difference in prices between 
clear and vague bets. In absence of a direct comparison . . . this difference is smaller but it 
does not disappear.” Id. at 136. 
 93. This discussion assumes that the goal is to maximize compliance with the tax law. 
Of course, it might be better, in a larger sense, for individuals not to comply with tax law. 
The law itself may be flawed; it is not impossible, for example, that a taxpayer could do 
more to maximize overall welfare by investing his money in something other than the U.S. 
government. But this Article assumes for the sake of discussion that the government should 
maximize compliance. 
 94. See supra Part II.B.5. 
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faced no uncertainty, whereas if he did take the position, he faced uncertainty 
(in addition to a possible penalty). Thus, the model recommends that the gov-
ernment should manipulate uncertainty by making some sorts of tax positions 
subject to uncertainty, while leaving others subject to little or no uncertainty. In 
other words, the model suggests the government should very roughly break tax 
behavior into two categories: an uncertainty-free but still risky category (corre-
sponding to the left-hand side of the uncertainty model) and an uncertainty  
category (corresponding to the right-hand side). 
The uncertainty model thus supports the government’s keeping certain  
information secret. For example, the IRS decides whom to audit based on, 
among other methods, something called the “Discriminant Index Function” 
(DIF), which uses a statistical profile to determine which tax returns are more 
likely to exclude income.95 The IRS keeps the DIF a secret, so that taxpayers 
do not know the probability that their tax return will be flagged by the DIF and 
selected for further review.96 The uncertainty model suggests that revealing the 
DIF, or otherwise providing taxpayers with information about the probability 
that they will be audited, could reduce compliance.  
The uncertainty model also suggests, however, that there is a second piece 
to handling information about the DIF: the government should (as it does) 
make public that some suspicious combinations of information on a tax return 
are more likely to trigger an audit than others, and that avoiding these “red 
flags” reduces or eliminates the chance of being caught by the DIF and leaves a 
taxpayer open primarily to audits at a known audit rate. By implying that tax-
payers who engage in standard, uninteresting behavior (for example, earning 
only income subject to information reporting, and taking the standard deduc-
tion) will not be caught by the DIF, the government creates the uncertainty-free 
left-hand side of the model. By refusing to release the DIF or provide details 
about how it works, the government creates the uncertainty in the right-hand 
side of the model for taxpayers who engage in some range of more questiona-
ble transactions. 
The uncertainty model provides less support, however, for creating uncer-
tainty not only about the probability of audit, but also, in certain situations, 
about the substance of the law itself. Recall that δ includes uncertainty not only 
about the probability that one will be audited, but also about the probability that 
if one is audited, a court would strike down the tax position in question. Thus 
the uncertainty model might appear to suggest that if the government wants to 
drive taxpayers away from some class of transactions, it should make the parts 
of the tax law relating to those transactions unclear so that the probability of 
success of those tax positions is uncertain. The uncertainty model, in other 
words, might seem to suggest that legal uncertainty is not always bad. (By “le-
gal uncertainty,” I do not mean only that taxpayers do not know the substantive 
 
 95. Lawsky, supra note 25, at 165-66. 
 96. Lawsky, supra note 12, at 1068-69. 
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outcome of taking a particular tax position; rather, I mean that they do not 
know the substantive outcome and they do not know the probabilities of the 
various possible outcomes.) 
It might initially seem, therefore, that the uncertainty model adds new sup-
port for standards in the longstanding debate about rules and standards in the 
tax law.97 Consider, for example, the question of whether anti-abuse doctrines 
should be used to fight tax shelters, transactions that “appear to comply in a lit-
eral manner with the [Internal Revenue] Code, but which are designed to reach 
a tax result that Congress would not have intended.”98 The government’s main 
weapons against tax shelters are standard-like common law doctrines, such as 
the sham transaction doctrine,99 the business purpose doctrine,100 and the eco-
nomic substance doctrine,101 that can apply to strike down even transactions 
that adhere to the letter of the tax law. Additionally, an anti-abuse standard for 
tax shelters was codified in 2010.102 The statute permits a court to strike down 
a transaction that adheres to the rest of the tax law if the transaction does not 
change the taxpayer’s economic position in a “meaningful way,” or the taxpay-
er does not have a “substantial purpose” aside from tax effects for entering into 
the transaction.103 It is, needless to say, difficult to tell in advance what trans-
actions would violate this provision, and the IRS has declined to issue an “an-
gel list” that lists particular transactions that would be unaffected by the statute, 
 
 97. The literature on this topic is voluminous. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Common 
Knowledge of Tax Abuse, 54 SMU L. REV. 131 (2001) (arguing in favor of standards); Alan 
Gunn, Tax Avoidance, 76 MICH. L. REV. 733 (1978) (arguing against standards, and in par-
ticular that “tax-avoidance purpose” is never a satisfactory reason to strike down a tax posi-
tion); David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860 (1999) (argu-
ing that the tax law should include some standards in order to permit the law to be less 
complex). For a more general argument that knowledge of the tax law is not always socially 
desirable, see David Weisbach, Is Knowledge of the Tax Law Socially Desirable? (Univ. of 
Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 563 (2d series), 2011), avail-
able at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/563-daw-knowledge.pdf. 
 98. Steven A. Dean & Lawrence M. Solan, Tax Shelters and the Code: Navigating Be-
tween Text and Intent, 26 VA. TAX REV. 879, 882 (2007). 
 99. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 572-73 (1978) (“[T]he 
Court has refused to permit the transfer of formal legal title to shift the incidence of taxation 
attributable to ownership of property where the transferor continues to retain significant con-
trol over the property transferred . . . . In the light of these general and established principles, 
the Government takes the position that the . . . transaction should be regarded as a sham. The 
agreement as a whole . . . was only an elaborate financing scheme . . . .”). 
100. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935) (holding that a cor-
porate reorganization “having no business or corporate purpose” would not affect a compa-
ny’s tax liability). 
101. See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund ex rel. St. Croix Ventures v. United States, 
568 F.3d 537, 543-44 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The economic substance doctrine allows courts to 
enforce the legislative purpose of the Code by preventing taxpayers from reaping tax bene-
fits from transactions lacking in economic reality.”). 
102. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 
§ 1409, 124 Stat. 1029, 1067-68 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o) (2011)). 
103. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o)(1). 
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preferring instead to tell taxpayers simply that “relevant case law under the 
common-law economic substance doctrine” continues to apply.104 
However, government manipulation of uncertainty is less likely to be  
effective than it might initially appear. It is true that because the anti-abuse  
doctrines are standards, not rules, taxpayers will be unsure not only whether 
their position will be captured by an anti-abuse doctrine, but also the probabil-
ity that their position will be captured by such a doctrine. But such standards 
may create noncomparative uncertainty.105 That is, a taxpayer deciding wheth-
er to engage in a potentially dubious transaction may simply know that he is  
deciding whether to engage in a transaction and that he does not know the 
chance that the transaction will be struck down. He is not given a choice  
between a transaction with a known probability of being struck down and a 
transaction with an unknown probability of being struck down. Because ambi-
guity aversion decreases or even disappears in a noncomparative situation, the 
model suggests that ambiguity aversion may not weigh in favor of using stand-
ards as opposed to rules to battle tax shelters. 
There are also objections to unknown probabilities in the tax law that are 
not captured by the uncertainty model. For example, uncertainty aversion could 
overdeter taxpayers’ participation in transactions that might trigger an audit  
under the DIF, or be examined under the anti-abuse doctrines, but that would 
nonetheless be upheld, and might even increase societal welfare overall. Or  
increasing uncertainty, even in limited areas of the tax law, might undermine 
taxpayers’ confidence in the tax system and thus reduce compliance. And if the 
U.S. tax system has more uncertainty than other tax systems, businesses may 
choose to go to other countries. 
Even, or perhaps especially, if one rejects a consequentialist approach, one 
might still be concerned about increasing uncertainty. One could argue that 
people have the right to know their chances of audit, or the right not to adhere 
to anything beyond the actual words of a statute.106 Moreover, using uncertain-
ty as a compliance tool may have distributional consequences. Middle- or  
lower-income taxpayers may be more affected by uncertainty than wealthy  
taxpayers who can hire tax advisors to eliminate uncertainty. That the uncer-
tainty model does not resolve these questions should not be surprising, though, 
because the uncertainty model, like the expected utility model, provides insight 
only into the question of how to increase the tax paid, not whether using these 
approaches to increase the tax paid is socially desirable. 
 
104. I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411. 
105. See discussion supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text. 
106. See, e.g., Gunn, supra note 97. 
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C. Penalizing Tax Advisors 
Tax advisors are subject to a number of possible penalties, including cen-
sure, suspension, and disbarment, for providing tax advice that is insufficiently 
supported by facts and law.107 Legal practitioners and scholars tend to charac-
terize these penalties as an attempt to dissuade tax advisors from contributing 
to tax evasion.108 The uncertainty model suggests an additional reason either to 
penalize tax advisors or to increase penalties for a taxpayer who uses a tax  
advisor and takes a position that is ultimately struck down: tax advisors may 
decrease taxpayers’ uncertainty and thus increase the CEU of taking a particu-
lar position for a taxpayer who is uncertainty averse.109 
Consider again the example above where the taxpayer’s uncertainty about 
his own probability estimate combined with his pessimism meant that he chose 
to comply with the tax law even though the expected utility (as opposed to 
CEU) of not complying exceeded the expected utility of complying.110 If the 
taxpayer were more certain about his position, he would choose not to comply. 
In the above example, the taxpayer’s doubt (δ) was quantified at 70%, meaning 
that the taxpayer was very uncertain about the probability he assigned to 
whether his position would be struck down. If the taxpayer could reduce that 
level of doubt to, say, 50%, he would choose not to comply, because his CEU 
would be greater for not complying (4.102) than for complying (4.094).  
A tax advisor can reduce a taxpayer’s doubt about a tax position. After all, 
the advisor is paid for his expertise. On his own, a taxpayer might feel unsure 
about the chance that a given position will be struck down, but an advisor can 
provide not only a probability estimate, but also certainty about that estimate. It 
is not that the advisor’s estimate is “correct” in some larger sense, but rather 
that the taxpayer may have more faith in the advisor’s view than in his own. 
The taxpayer may believe that the advisor has more information, such as great-
er knowledge of audit rates or audit patterns, a better sense of what courts tend 
to do when faced with similar transactions, or a better understanding of tax law.  
Indeed, depending on the taxpayer’s level of pessimism, the taxpayer 
might be willing to take the position even if the tax advisor says that he be-
lieves there is a lower chance of success than the taxpayer originally estimated. 
In the above scenario, for example, the taxpayer initially thought that there was 
 
107. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.50-10.51 (2011) (codifying a portion of Treasury De-
partment Circular 230, which imposes a variety of penalties on tax advisors who do not suf-
ficiently support their conclusions, including censure, suspension, and disbarment). 
108. See, e.g., Deborah H. Schenk, The Circular 230 Amendments: Time to Throw 
Them Out and Start Over, 110 TAX NOTES 1311, 1312 (2006); Michael Schler, Effects of 
Anti-Tax-Shelter Rules on Nonshelter Tax Practice, 109 TAX NOTES 915, 918-19 (2005). 
109. Arcand et al., supra note 56, at 23, proposes that uncertainty aversion explains 
why taxpayers use accounting firms to prepare tax returns, although this portion of their arti-
cle remains only a suggestion; the simulations remain to be done. 
110. See supra Part II.B.5. 
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a 65% chance that the position would be struck down. If a tax advisor tells the 
taxpayer that there is a 70% chance the position will be struck down, but the 
tax advisor also eliminates all doubt in the taxpayer’s mind about that 70% 
probability, the taxpayer will change his mind: before he hired the tax advisor, 
he would choose to comply, but now that he has hired the tax advisor and elim-
inated all doubt about the chance that his position will be struck down, he will 
choose not to comply. He will choose not to comply even though the tax advi-
sor told him his position was less likely to succeed than the taxpayer originally 
thought. Thus, perhaps counterintuitively, even a conservative tax advisor 
could cause an uncertainty-averse taxpayer to comply less than he would with-
out a tax advisor. 
This provides another justification for imposing penalties on tax advisors 
who provide unsupported tax advice: to increase the cost of obtaining tax  
advice. In order to provide an opinion on which a taxpayer can rely and avoid 
incurring penalties, tax advisors must put in many hours of work establishing 
the facts and law. These hours of work translate into higher fees for taxpayers, 
and thus may make it too expensive for some taxpayers to ask a tax advisor to 
provide certainty about a tax position. 
This insight does not resolve the problem of whether tax advisors should 
face large penalties. There are many other issues to consider. Preventing  
taxpayers from seeking tax advice may deter some taxpayers from taking socie-
tally desirable positions. Increasing the cost of tax advice may increase 
deadweight loss. Even more fundamentally, this approach assumes that we 
want taxpayers to pay as much tax as possible. Again, the uncertainty model 
cannot resolve these questions. 
D. Future Research: Identifying Attitudes Toward Uncertainty 
Although degrees of uncertainty and attitudes toward uncertainty could in 
theory make a marginal difference in taxpayers’ behavior, we need more  
information to know when uncertainty in fact makes a difference, and thus to 
know how to adjust policies to address uncertainty. What little empirical work 
exists in this area does provide some insight into unknown probabilities and tax 
compliance. One study, for example, found that while less ambiguity concern-
ing the audit rate reduced compliance, reducing uncertainty does not have as 
much of an effect when taxpayers believe that their audit rate is relatively 
low.111 Empirical work has also found that the effect of reducing uncertainty 
varies depending on whether taxpayers believe that they receive a benefit for 
their tax payments.112 And it may be that taxpayers who are more likely to  
engage in dubious transactions do not share the general aversion to uncertainty. 
 
111. Ghosh & Crain, supra note 11, at 799-800. 
112. James Alm et al., Institutional Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance, 82 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1018, 1024-25 (1992). 
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However, much more empirical investigation remains to be done, especial-
ly on taxpayers’ degrees of uncertainty (represented in the model by δ) and atti-
tudes toward uncertainty (α, the taxpayer’s optimism or pessimism). Research-
ers could, for example, study variation among types of taxpayers’ attitudes 
towards uncertainty, or variation among attitudes toward uncertainty depending 
on the type of uncertainty. This Subpart discusses each possibility in turn. 
First, researchers might study whether different types of taxpayers have 
different attitudes toward uncertainty. Just as tax officers for corporations seem 
to approach tax planning more risk-neutrally than individual taxpayers,113 cor-
porate tax officers might be more tolerant of uncertainty than individual tax-
payers. Researchers might also compare wealthier taxpayers’ attitudes toward 
uncertainty with the attitudes of lower-income taxpayers, or small businesses’ 
attitudes with those of larger businesses. This information could help shape the 
government’s enforcement efforts. For example, the government might feel 
more confident about reducing uncertainty for corporations if corporations are 
neutral toward uncertainty, but more cautious about creating clear guidelines in 
all situations for groups of individual taxpayers who tend to be uncertainty 
averse. The government could, in other words, tailor its enforcement approach 
based on groups’ particular attitudes toward uncertainty. 
Second, while the model imagines a taxpayer who combines all relevant 
probabilities into one probability (p) about which the taxpayer may feel some 
doubt (δ), scholars and policymakers may wish to break p down further, by 
identifying types of uncertainty and particular decisions about which a taxpayer 
may experience uncertainty.  
Take, for example, an individual taxpayer deciding whether to engage in a 
transaction that will not be subject to information reporting. The taxpayer may 
assign probabilities to, among other things, the chance that his tax return will 
be audited; the chance that if his tax return is audited, the IRS will discover his 
position; the chance that if the IRS discovers his position, it will decide to chal-
lenge it; the chance that if the IRS challenges it, the taxpayer will be unsuccess-
ful in persuading the auditor that the position is a good position; the chance 
that, if the position ends up in court, the court will strike down the position; the 
chance that a penalty will be imposed, and if so, the chance that the IRS will be 
satisfied with, say, a 20% underpayment penalty,114 or will ask for a larger 
penalty, such as a 75% fraud penalty.115 
Not only will the probabilities the taxpayer assigns to these various events 
be different, but the taxpayer’s degree of certainty and attitude toward uncer-
tainty could vary systematically. A taxpayer may have different attitudes  
toward uncertainty depending on whether he faces factual uncertainty (for ex-
ample, not knowing whether he will be selected for audit) or legal uncertainty 
 
113. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 51, at 239. 
114. See 26 U.S.C. § 6662 (2011). 
115. See id. § 6663. 
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(for example, not knowing how a court will treat a particular tax position). Or 
variations in attitudes might be even more fine-grained: a taxpayer might be 
pessimistic regarding his chance of audit (that is, he may overweight the prob-
ability he assigns to the chance of being audited), but given that he is audited, 
he might be neither pessimistic nor optimistic about the probability he assigns 
to the outcome of the audit (because, for example, he may defer completely to 
his tax advisor’s views). With more research, tax compliance efforts could be  
tailored not only to address different types of taxpayers’ attitudes toward uncer-
tainty, but also to take into account how taxpayers’ levels of uncertainty and 
attitudes toward uncertainty vary based on the type of event about which they 
are uncertain. 
E. The Simplicity Objection 
One might object that the uncertainty model adds too much complexity to 
be useful. The uncertainty model requires quantifying uncertainty and levels of 
doubt, tasks which are at best difficult. How can we put a number to how much 
doubt someone has, or how much he disfavors or favors uncertainty? This is of 
course a problem; indeed, it is a problem with any model that relies on quanti-
fying almost anything, including probability, risk, utility functions, and so 
forth. However, that some ideas are difficult to quantify does not mean that we 
should reject all models, or even revert to the simpler models—we should not, 
that is, let the best be the enemy of the good, though of course we must keep in 
mind the limitations of our knowledge. As David Weisbach has written in a 
slightly different context, “One is forced between the Scylla of simple generali-
zations that are sometimes wrong and the Charybdis of an approach that is too 
complex to apply.”116 The uncertainty model is complex, but it is not too com-
plex to apply, and its advantages will sometimes outweigh the disadvantages of 
its complexity. 
While quantifying uncertainty and attitudes toward uncertainty is not easy, 
there are several ways to approach the project. Experimental work can suggest 
how much a person is willing to pay to avoid uncertainty—to reach a state 
where he knows a probability without doubt, or with less doubt (with more  
information).117 People might be asked to describe how uncertain they feel 
about something, and then that interpretation could be translated into numbers. 
By studying relatively small groups of people, with particular attention to types 
of taxpayers, the IRS could generate information that could be put to wider use 
in tax compliance.  
These methods are of course not precise, but we need not reject the uncer-
tainty model simply because the magnitude of doubt, or an attitude toward  
 
116. David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1670-71 (1999). 
117. See, e.g., Camerer & Weber, supra note 4, at 335-37. 
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uncertainty, cannot be exactly quantified, if the uncertainty model provides 
some advantage over other models. Put another way, the expected value and 
expected utility models each consider doubt to be zero, so the question is really 
whether it is better to assume that taxpayers have no doubt at all, or to come up 
with a number or range that represents taxpayers’ level of doubt and their atti-
tudes toward uncertainty. Because taking uncertainty into account can, as  
explained above, make a significant difference in how we think about tax com-
pliance, it may be better, when faced with certain questions, to represent uncer-
tainty, albeit roughly, than to ignore it entirely, especially as experimental work 
provides additional information about levels of doubt and of uncertainty aver-
sion or preference. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has presented a new formal model of tax compliance, the  
uncertainty model, which, unlike any other formal model used in tax legal 
scholarship, incorporates the level of taxpayers’ uncertainty as well as their at-
titudes about uncertainty. The uncertainty model captures something real about 
the world that other models neglect, helps us develop new intuitions about 
longstanding questions in tax compliance, and suggests new areas of research, 
and thus is one useful approach to thinking about tax compliance.  
